Diversity of Zainichi Koreans and their ties to Japan and Korea by Lee, Soo im
Afrasian Research Centre, Ryukoku University?
Phase 2
Working Paper Series
Studies on Multicultural Societies No.8
Diversity of Zainichi Koreans and 
Their Ties to Japan and Korea
Soo im Lee
Mission of the Afrasian Research Centre 
 
 Today's globalised world has witnessed astonishing political and economic growth in 
the regions of Asia and Africa. Such progress has been accompanied, however, with a 
high frequency of various types of conflicts and disputes. The Afrasian Research Centre 
aims to build on the achievements of its predecessor, the Afrasian Centre for Peace and 
Development Studies (ACPDS), by applying its great tradition of research towards Asia 
with the goal of building a new foundation for interdisciplinary research into 
multicultural societies in the fields of Immigration Studies, International Relations and 
Communication Theory. In addition, we seek to clarify the processes through which 
conflicts are resolved, reconciliation is achieved and multicultural societies are 
established. Building on the expertise and networks that have been accumulated in 
Ryukoku University in the past (listed below), we will organise research projects to 
tackle new and emerging issues in the age of globalisation. We aim to disseminate the 
results of our research internationally, through academic publications and engagement 
in public discourse. 
 
 
??A Tradition of Religious and Cultural Studies 
??Expertise in Participatory Research/ Inter-Civic Relation Studies 
??Expertise in Asian and Africa Studies 
??Expertise in Communication and Education Studies  
??New Approaches to the Understanding of Other Cultures in Japan  
??Domestic and International Networks with Major Research Institutes 
 
Afrasian  Research Centre, Ryukoku University
Diversity of Zainichi Koreans and 
Their Ties to Japan and Korea
Soo im Lee
Working Paper Series
Studies on Multicultural Societies No.8
2012
?????????????????
 1  
 
 
 
Diversity of Zainichi Koreans and Their Ties to Japan and Korea1 
 
Soo im Lee* 
 
 
 
Introduction 
      
Multiple generations of Koreans, numbering just under 600,0002 and in diverse legal and 
residential categories, reside in Japan today. The majority of these resident Koreans, 
commonly termed zainichi (Japanese: “present in Japan”) Koreans, are descendants of 
colonial-era migrants from the southern Korean peninsula during the first half of the 
twentieth century.  It is in fact not always obvious who belongs to the zainichi Korean 
collective. They appear indistinguishable from the Japanese, and their cultural literacy, use of 
Japanese pass names,3 and native fluency in Japanese allows “passing” as a way of life, 
making them an invisible postcolonial community.            
  
Despite the community’s high degree of social and cultural assimilation to Japanese society, 
zainichi Koreans are legally marginalized and treated as foreign residents. Although over 80 
percent of zainichi Koreans were born in Japan, and the current demographics include highly 
assimilated second, third and fourth generations, they are categorized as foreign residents 
unless they go through the strict process of naturalization. In this respect, Japan is currently 
the only advanced nation with a fourth-generation immigrant problem derived from 
exclusivist policies in dealing with foreign residents, particularly colonial subjects.  
      
                                                          
* Professor, Faculty of Business Administration, Ryukoku University. 
1 The early version of this manuscript was presented at the followings; the 2012 International Conference on 
Japanese Studies, “Migration and the Creation of Japan’s Multicutural Society: Workers, Women, and the Next 
Generation” at Ateneo De Manial University (January 27, 2012). Bo?aziçi University-Ryukoku University 
Afrasian Research Centre First International Workshop (March 3, 2012).   
2 The total number of resident foreigners (the 2010 data from the Ministry of Justice) is 2,134,151. Zainichi 
Koreans were the largest group until 2007, when Chinese-nationality residents replaced them. The Korean 
community is shrinking rapidly because of the aging of the first and second generations, Japanese citizenship 
acquisition, and intermarriage with Japanese. The Ministry of Justice reported 565,989 residents in the category 
of Korea and Ch?sen. Special permanent residents, permanent residents, and visa holders are all included in the 
category.  
3 Japanese pass names are legally approved, and the government maintains that the use of Japanese names helps 
Koreans avoid discrimination. Two names are registered in the drivers’ license, and more than 90 percent of 
Koreans use their Japanese pass names at schools, at work and in their daily lives. 
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It is important to note, however, that Koreans were Japanese nationals under colonial rule, 
and it was not until 1952 that they were forcibly deprived of Japanese citizenship (Tanaka 
1995).  This was a violation of international law and a different path from that taken by 
Germany, which offered its former colonized citizens the choice of either remaining German 
citizens or recovering their original citizenship. This legal exclusion of former colonial 
subjects may not have been a concern for Korean migrants who repatriated to the Korean 
peninsula after World War II, but it had a significant impact on the lives of the one million 
Koreans who remained in Japan.  
      
Different historical and social circumstances shaped zainichi Korean experiences across 
multiple generations. When Korea was colonized in 1910, first-generation Koreans who 
migrated to Japan experienced relentless discrimination due to their ethnic background and 
second-class status. The second generation, born in Japan, continued to be excluded from 
mainstream society, were affected by various forms of prejudice, and were barred from equal 
participation in society. The third generation, born during the era of the Japanese civil rights 
movement and internationalization, began voicing their concerns and demanding equal rights. 
The result was that ethnic identity formation differed greatly among these three generations. 
In addition, differences in citizenship (South Korean, those who have retained Joseon (old, 
undivided Korea, or naturalized Japanese of Korean descents), ideology (pledging allegiance 
to North Korea or not), educational factors (being educated in Japanese or Korean ethnic 
schools), and socioeconomic background heightened the diversity among Koreans living in 
Japan.  
 
This paper focuses on zainichi Korean identity, ethnicity, and citizenship from a historical 
and contemporary perspective in relation to ties to their homelands?South and North Korea 
as well as Japan. This study also aims at illuminating the changing circumstances and shifting 
identities across different generations, and discusses the future prospects of Japan’s oldest, 
yet diminishing, postcolonial community. 
 
1. Historical Background 
     
In this section, the legal status of Koreans in Japan from 1910 to the present is traced 
chronologically.   
       
During the 1910s, confiscations of land and rice harvests carried out against Korean farmers 
under Japanese colonial rule led to a rural exodus of Korean farmers seeking work overseas 
(So 1987). Increasing numbers of displaced farmers in the southern regions who had lost their 
land migrated to Japan. By 1920, approximately 30,000 Koreans had migrated to Japan 
(Kawa 1997, 22). After Japan's rice riots in 1918, Japan reorganized the farm villages of its 
colonies to stabilize the rice supply. This led to an increase in migration, with 300,000 to 
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400,000 Korean farmers entering Japan by the year 1930 (Ibid, 22). Since Koreans were 
Japanese citizens under the colonial nationality clause, migration from the periphery of the 
empire to large Japanese cities was considered domestic migration, although migrants had to 
apply for permission to relocate (Ibid, 24). Korean language and culture was discouraged and 
eventually forbidden during the colonial period, and Japan's religion of Shintoism and system 
of Emperor worship were forced upon colonized subjects.  
 
Since Korea had become a logistical base for Japan’s invasion of China, the destruction of 
farm villages proceeded and farmers began suffering from starvation. Koreans were displaced 
in the Japanese industrial market by low-paid unskilled labourers (So 1987; Lee 2005). Since 
many Japanese were conscripted after the outbreak of the Pacific War, the war industry faced 
labour shortages. Under the National Mobilization Law, Koreans were forcibly recruited as 
low paid workers under the most severe working conditions, mainly in construction, coal 
mining and metal manufacturing (Lee 2009).  
 
In 1945, Japan was defeated by the United States and the allied countries, and Korea was 
liberated. After Japan’s defeat, about 2 million Koreans were given the choice to return to 
Korea or remain in Japan. Of this number, approximately 650,000 remained in Japan. There 
are no precise records of the demographic differences between those who left Japan and those 
who stayed, but it is safe to assume that the majority of those who remained had been living 
in Japan for many years, were largely settled with Japanese-born, Japanese-speaking children, 
and enjoyed a relatively privileged status compared to newer immigrants, especially those 
who came under forced migration policies after 1940 (Lee and Tanaka, 2007). Nevertheless, 
any hope of eventual return was shattered when their homeland was partitioned between the 
Soviet-occupied north and the US-occupied south, and the subsequent Korean War (1950-
1953) consolidated the division.  
 
Under the occupation of the Allied Forces, primarily the United States, the status of zainichi 
Koreans was uncertain. General Douglas Macarthur received instructions from Washington 
to designate zainichi Koreans as “liberated nationals” or “enemy nationals.” Clause 11 of the 
Alien Registration Law, promulgated on May 2, 1947 as Edict No. 207, stipulated that 
“Koreans designated by the Ministry of Justice, as well as Taiwanese, are to be considered 
foreigners for the time being” (Tanaka 1995, 2006). As a result, former colonized subjects 
with limited Japanese citizenship were registered as foreigners and obliged at all times to 
carry alien registration documents stating their nationality as Korean. However, this did not 
signify official nationality status, due to the precarious situation in their homeland.  
      
In 1952, when the Treaty of San Francisco came into effect and Japan recovered its 
autonomy, the Japanese citizenship of Koreans living in Japan was revoked without advance 
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notice of any kind. In the meantime, Koreans in Japan began to change their nationality in 
their alien registration documents from Korean to South Korean.  
 
After Japan-South Korea diplomatic relations were re-established in 1965, Koreans were 
granted the right to reside in Japan as permanent residents. However, since the reconciliation 
was made with only one of the Koreas, those who chose South Korea became South Korean 
nationals, while those who supported the North could not obtain the right to permanent 
residency and became stateless. In 1959, a major repatriation project was started when Il-
sung Kim promised “a dream life after their return to the homeland” to celebrate the tenth 
anniversary of North Korea’s founding. A repatriation campaign by Chongryon (Japanese: 
Ch?sen S?ren) succeeded in repatriating 89,011 Koreans by 1967 (Kim 2004).  
 
According to the Japan-South Korea Foreign Exchange Memorandum of 1991, the right to 
permanent residency was recognized for descendants of all former colonial subjects living in 
Japan (Tanaka 1995). The right to permanent residency for both groups, those of South 
Korean nationality and pro-North Koreans, was assured as special permanent residents. 
 
2. Struggle between Assimilation and Separation 
 
Yun (1992) points out that the ethnicity shared among first-generation Korean immigrants 
served as a bulwark against the social injustice they faced in Japan. For the sake of their 
children, they were torn between assimilation and separation, and some achieved 
socioeconomic mobility despite being excluded from the mainstream. First-generation 
Korean immigrants were highly motivated to work as low-wage labourers under harsh 
conditions. Due to discrimination, the language barrier, and lack of education, the only 
available jobs for many Koreans were so-called “three D” (dangerous, demanding, and dirty) 
jobs. Koreans in Osaka often found employment in glass, fabric spinning, and rubber 
factories (Kawa 1996; Kashani 2006; Willis and Lee 2007; Nagano 2010). They also toiled in 
coal mines and on canal construction projects (Lee 2009).   
      
There is ample research on the historical and social background of zainichi Koreans, but not 
enough empirical research on the first generation’s identity and value system. The degree of 
transculturation among first-generation immigrants varies depending on their social and 
economic background, but their cultural norms were heavily influenced by Confucianism 
(Kawa 1997; Kashani 2006). Male dominance, loyalty towards ancestors, hard work, and 
frugality were key characteristics used to describe the culture of early Korean immigrants. 
But in many cases, their uprootedness led to unstable psychological states, trauma, and 
devastated lives.  
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Zainichi Korean Seok-il Yan’s novel Blood and Bones depicts the psychological makeup of 
first-generation Koreans during the colonial and post-colonial era. Set in 1930s Osaka and 
modeled on the life of the author’s father, the novel centers on Jun-pyong Kim, a man held in 
awe even by gangsters due to his physique and ferocity. It traces his success as a fish paste 
maker and high-interest loan shark, both typical businesses of Korean entrepreneurs. 
Violence inflicted on himself and his family is one of the central themes of this novel, which 
depicts his temperamental character. The novel ends with his inability to find a place in 
Japanese society and his return to his “roots” in North Korea, where he expects a better life 
than the one he had in Japan. But instead, he realizes that he belongs in neither place, and 
faces a solitary death. As seen in Kim’s life, the lives of those who returned to North Korea 
were far from ideal, and many died in concentration camps as political criminals (An and 
Ikeda 1997).  
 
3. Struggle between Assimilation and Discrimination 
 
Koreans who returned to North Korea in the 1950s and 1960s believed that life there would 
be heavenly compared to that in Japan. However, after arriving in North Korea and seeing the 
realities of life in the capital city, Pyongyang, some quickly realized that the North's 
propaganda was a lie. Zainichi Koreans were severely discriminated against in North Korea, 
categorized as secondary citizens, and often placed in worse situations than they had 
experienced in Japan. There was social stigma attached to being a zainichi Korean, because 
these individuals were culturally and linguistically Japanese in many ways. Ironically, the 
late ruler of North Korea, Jong-il Kim married a zainichi Korean from Osaka and her son, 
Jong-un Kim became the heir. When he was selected as the ruler of North Korea, North 
Korean government hid the fact that his mother’s background because it would have 
conveyed a second-class image to the public.  
      
What is particularly unique about Koreans in Japan compared to other overseas Koreans is 
that postcolonial circumstances, the Cold War, and the division of their homeland in 
particular led to the formation of two distinct ethnic organizations within their community: 
the General Association of Korean Residents in Japan (Japanese: Ch?sen S?ren; Korean: 
Chongryun) and the Korean Residents Union in Japan (Japanese: Mindan). These 
organizations have ties to the two Koreas, North and South, and have provided indispensable 
infrastructural support for ethnic Koreans living and working in Japan who lacked legal 
protection. They were especially important for first-generation Koreans who were not eligible 
to receive social welfare benefits from the Japanese government.  
      
Although Japan's Ministry of Justice categorizes Koreans as a single group based on 
nationality, it still uses the terms zainichi Kankoku jin (Japan-resident South Korean) and 
zainichi Ch?sen jin (Japan-resident North Korean). The former indicates those who have 
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South Korean nationality, while the latter indicates those without South Korean nationality, 
and who are therefore legally stateless. However, all Korean immigrants, including more 
recent immigrants, are placed in the same category. Such an approach is problematic. 
Colonial immigrants should be treated as “distinct” from more recent immigrants, because 
their historical background is so “distinct.”  
       
Another problem with the government's description is that the term Ch?sen jin conveys the 
impression that these individuals came from North Korea. It is important to note, however, 
that since more than 98 percent of first-generation zainichi Koreans came originally from the 
southern provinces, the vast majority of “North” Koreans in Japan trace their ancestors to 
South Korea despite ideological and political allegiance to the North. It is not uncommon for 
Ch?sen S?ren Koreans to travel to South Korea to visit their ancestor’s graves. Therefore, the 
zainichi Korean “homeland” is not necessarily confined to one of the two Koreas. The truth is 
often complicated by sentiments shaped by state affiliation, family genealogy, and ethnic 
heritage. 
      
The two Korean political organizations in Japan were initially influential in discouraging 
their members from assimilating into Japanese society, specifically discouraging 
naturalization to preserve their national and cultural identities as Koreans (Chung 2006). This 
has also been important for institutional survival and to maintain solidarity among zainichi 
Koreans. However, as younger Koreans’ sentiments towards Japan and their homeland(s) 
began to shift, permanent settlement became the reality for most Koreans living in Japan. 
With repatriation no longer a motive, the purposes of the political organizations also began to 
change. Civic movements, especially those organized by Mindan, began to advocate zainichi 
Koreans as transnational citizens of Japan and demanded political participation at regional 
and local levels. On the other hand, Ch?sen S?ren is requesting legitimate status for its ethnic 
schools to preserve Korean language and culture, but is not interested in acquiring voting 
rights or promoting integration into mainstream society (Minzoku sabetsu to kokuseki wo 
kangaeru Kyoto no kai 2002; Lee and Willis 2009). 
 
4. Diversified Zainichi Korean Identities 
 
Korean youths usually become conscious of their ethnic roots in a fully assimilated 
environment during the first phase of their identity formation. The childhood experience of 
discrimination awakens them and forces them to face the reality associated with being 
different from others. Compared to first-generation Koreans, who have stronger ties to the 
homeland, most second-generation Koreans were born and raised in Japan, educated in 
Japanese schools, and are unfamiliar with Korea and its culture. Nevertheless, most of them 
experience direct or indirect discrimination and prejudice at some point in their lives. 
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Fukuoka and Tsujiyama (1991) examine the different forms of zainichi Korean identity and 
argue that zainichi Koreans fall into one of four groups. Pluralists aim to “live with Japanese” 
and are classified as “oriented towards Japan.” Nationalists live as “overseas citizens” and 
are classified as “oriented towards ancestral lands.” Individualists do not think of their 
identity in terms of Korea or Japan, and are classified as “oriented towards the individual.” 
Assimilationists aim to “become Japanese” and are classified as “oriented towards 
assimilation.”   
      
Pluralists take a symbiotic approach and emphasize the importance of living together with the 
Japanese without, however, denying their ethnic identities. Although still few, increasing 
numbers of Pluralists are beginning to maintain their own ethnic names even after being 
naturalized. Nationalists represent Chongryun Koreans and work to preserve Korean values, 
tradition, culture, and language. They regard naturalization as a betrayal of their ancestors 
and wish to protect their legal status as overseas Koreans. Individualists emphasize 
socioeconomic achievement and often devote their lives to financial success. They seem 
oblivious to their minority position and disinterested in zainichi Korean politics, 
concentrating instead on having a prosperous and satisfying life. Assimilationists take 
Japanese citizenship, use Japanese names, deny their ethnic roots, and live as Japanese.  
      
Chung (2006, 128) explains that zainichi Korean identities are affected by six factors, 
following Suh’s interpretation (Suh 1997, 23): 1) the division of the Korean peninsula; 2) the 
separation of Koreans in Japan from the homeland; 3) forced assimilation and exclusion by 
Japanese society; 4) the respective economic situations of the homeland and Japan; 5) the 
state of democratization in the homeland; and 6) individual social-psychological factors. It is 
not appropriate to generalize about collective zainichi Korean identity, because zainichi 
Koreans are diverse depending on how they interact with Japanese society. Factors affecting 
zainichi Korean identities also include their upbringing, education, and whether or not they 
live in locations with high concentrations of zainichi Koreans. With increasing rates of 
naturalization and intermarriage with Japanese, however, the zainichi Korean community is 
expected to vanish over time. This is especially due to Japan’s rigid and continued policies 
against long-term foreign residents, as well as the lack of educational opportunities outside 
the ethnic community to learn about their history and the significance of their presence in 
Japanese society.   
 
5. Naturalization and Acquisition of Japanese Citizenship 
 
Japan is a jus sanguinis state as opposed to a jus soli state like the United States, Canada, and 
Australia, meaning that it assigns citizenship by blood but not place of birth. Until 1985, 
Japan’s Nationality Law was patrilineal. In 1985, the law was amended to incorporate the 
ambilineal principle, so that children born to zainichi Korean and Japanese parents are 
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automatically granted Japanese citizenship. Lineage remains the most important criterion for 
obtaining citizenship under the Nationality Law; foreigners remain foreigners regardless of 
how many generations their ancestors have continuously lived in Japan.    
 
Since over 60 percent of applicants for naturalization in Japan are Korean nationals, Japanese 
naturalization policies are likely to have major implications for the future of both Japanese 
society and the Korean community in Japan. Yet, despite its importance, relatively little is 
known about how Japanese naturalization policy actually functions. Chung (2010) points out 
that the process of naturalization is highly contingent and almost always requires some form 
of assimilation, whether political or cultural. Japan is perhaps the only developed country 
which requires native-born applicants to go through a time-consuming procedure for 
naturalization.   
      
In connection with foreign residents of Japan, a senior immigration official commented: “We, 
the Japanese government, have the absolute power and right to do whatever we want with 
foreigners” (Tanaka 1995). The stronger the degree of discrimination, the more ambivalent 
zainichi Koreans are toward naturalization. One zainichi Korean stated that he would never 
be interested in naturalizing because it means “selling my soul to the Japanese discriminatory 
authority” (Lee 2001). In a paper published by the Ministry of Justice, Hidenori Sakanaka, an 
immigration official, claims that a paradoxical relationship exists between the strict Japanese 
policy and zainichi Korean persistence in adhering to their ethnicity and their homeland(s), 
and posits that the more restrictive the immigration policy, the stronger such adherence 
becomes. He advocates an accommodating naturalization policy  to promote assimilation to 
mainstream society (Sakanaka 1999).  
      
The number of registered foreigners in Japan increases by around 1.9 percent per year. Every 
year, approximately 10,000 additional applicants apply for naturalization. In addition, the 
Nationality Law was amended in 1985, and the governing principle was changed from 
patrilineal to ambilineal. This implies that if one of the parents is Japanese, their children will 
be granted Japanese citizenship automatically. Also of note is the fact that 90 percent of 
young zainichi Koreans today intermarry with Japanese. Based on these trends, Hidenori 
Sakanaka predicts that the number of special permanent residents will become nil in the 
foreseeable future.  
      
Some Koreans experience a change in identity after attaining Japanese citizenship. Japanese 
naturalization applications are regulated by “family application” based on a household 
registry system. Sasaki (2003) illuminates how first-generation Koreans differ from the 
second generation regarding acquisition of Japanese citizenship. In Sasaki's investigation of 
Koreans who naturalized, he presents the case of a father and daughter who acquired 
Japanese citizenship in 1977. Each interpreted the acquisition of citizenship differently. In the 
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father’s case, through naturalization, he attempted to deny his Korean identity and started to 
“think and act Japanese.” In contrast, the daughter, who was culturally and linguistically 
completely “Japanese” to begin with, began to deepen her understanding of “being Korean” 
after acquiring citizenship.  
 
Furthermore, in the study, “The Naturalization System for Foreigners in Japan,” Asakawa 
(2003) investigates Japan's naturalization system in detail based on 2,000 individuals, and 
analyzes 359 survey results. One question in the study deals with attitudes, subsequent to 
acquiring Japanese nationality, of those who nationalized. Informant answers are summarized 
below.  
 
1) I hope Japanese society will be more tolerant to Koreans and other foreigners. Even 
after being naturalized, my Korean identity has not been changed because it still defines 
who I am.  
 
2) I obtained Japanese citizenship but my identity has not changed. My ethnicity is 
Korean. We should have a more tolerant society where everyone can live without being 
discriminated against.  
 
3) I do not think that becoming a Japanese citizen is a betrayal of my own people. Even 
after being naturalized, I want to be known as a zainichi Korean.  
 
4) By obtaining Japanese citizenship, I felt a harmonious sentment between Korea, my 
ethnic heritage, and Japan, my birthplace and home. I may be Japanese in legal terms, 
but mentally and emotionally, I regard myself as a person of two nationalities.  
 
As we see in most responses, a hybrid or transnational identity is formed after naturalization, 
and individuals begin to define themselves beyond the limited framework of nation states 
(Lee 2002). This is a point on which Sil Pak, Choja Yun, and Yang Cheon all agreed. They 
felt that after naturalization, racial identity was strengthened. In response to being forced to 
legally adopt Japanese names, they filed a lawsuit, “Judicial Appeal for the Recovery of 
Ethnic Names,” to regain their Korean names lost after naturalization. Even if the framework 
of so-called Japanese “nationality” is protected, discrimination toward Koreans is still 
strongly embedded in the process. This lawsuit signifies a challenge made by naturalized 
“Japanese” toward Japan’s ideology of homogeneity as well as toward the zainichi Korean 
ideology that one has to keep one’s Korean nationality to preserve one’s ethnic identity. In 
1987 Pak legally recovered his ethnic name and confirmed his new Japanese-Korean identity 
(Lee and Tanaka 2007).   
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6. “Zainichi” as Transnational Identity  
 
In 2002, Jong-il Kim admitted that North Korea had been responsible for abducting Japanese 
citizens. Public hostility accelerated toward Korean ethnic schools, mainly those affiliated 
with Ch?sen S?ren, and even Korean parents and students began to feel skeptical toward the 
education being taught beneath classroom portraits of the two Great Leaders. A number of 
parents continued to voice their concern about the quality of this education and demanded 
changes in the curriculum.  
      
Korean ethnic schools today are rapidly losing students. The zainichi Korean community is 
also suffering from Japan’s low birth rate and aging population, and as a result, the number of 
students in Korean ethnic schools is also decreasing. The situation is exacerbated by the 
discriminatory policies of the Ministry of Education, Science, and Culture (MEXT). In March 
2003, MEXT excluded students of Korean ethnic schools from a new policy allowing 
students attending international schools to sit for Japanese university entrance exams.  
      
Moreover, Korean ethnic schools, which are defined as private “other category” (Japanese: 
kakushu) schools, are legally entitled to state and local government subsidies. In fact, while a 
number of local governments provide subsidies, albeit in small amounts, to Korean schools, 
the national government does not offer subsidies of any kind. As a result, the facilities of 
these schools are poor and school buildings are in great need of repair, with no proper safety 
measures for earthquakes. Furthermore, no health check or service is provided by local 
government for the children. If a communicable disease spreads, there are no measures or 
plans to deal with the situation.  
?
In 2006, those who were dissatisfied with the pro-Pyongyang schools and did not want to 
follow the Japanese curriculum opened the Korea International School in Ibaraki City, Osaka 
Prefecture. The school's establishment remains rooted in the colonial and postwar struggle 
and is aimed at preserving Korean ethnic and cultural identity in response to discrimination 
by the host country. The school’s mission differs greatly from that of other Korea 
International Schools elsewhere in the world today (Lee and Willis, 2009).  
      
This new school’s mission is to erase the invisible boundaries found within the Korean 
community in Japan by accepting Koreans with various nationalities, including students with 
Kankoku seki (South Korean nationality), Ch?sen seki (North Korean supporters), Nihon seki 
(Japanese nationality), Koreans with dual citizenship, and, more recently, ethnic Koreans 
with Chinese nationality. The underlying message is that for the younger generation, it is no 
longer necessary to have an exclusive relationship to any particular Korean state. According 
to the school’s principle, a more globalized cultural perspective is now a reality for Koreans 
living in Japan. 
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The melting pot of culture and ancestry of Koreans living in Japan, as well as Koreans living 
scattered throughout the world, has created a situation which transcends the North-South 
dichotomy. Zainichi Koreans are now a living bridge connecting Japan and other regions of 
East Asia. Unlike traditional Korean ethnic schools or Mindan-supported schools, the Korea 
International School teaches the meaning of the East Asian perspective?historically, 
culturally and politically. The meanings of “host” and “homeland” thus become increasingly 
complex and dynamic. The school's goal is to nurture global citizens with transnational 
qualities. It welcomes prospective students in an admissions process not bound by the 
ideology of the nation state, but open to all. The youth should still possess their roots in local 
areas. In fact, because of the uncertainty of the future, being “transnational” and 
“transcultural” have replaced “being ethnic Koreans.” 
 
7. Barriers to Zainichi Korean Social Integration 
      
Even for those educated in Japanese schools who are socially and culturally assimilated, 
structural discrimination prevents zainichi Koreans from full social participation. The two 
cases outlined below suggest that such legal barriers can affect both zainichi Koreans who 
maintain their Korean nationalities and those who naturalize. 
      
Among second-generation zainchi Koreans educated in Japanese schools, few individuals 
dream of directly participating in Japanese society at a national level. Naturalized politician 
Shokei Arai (Korean name: Kyonje Park), born January 12, 1948, is an example of someone 
who did. Arai was a highly assimilated zainichi Korean who became an elite bureaucrat and 
was expected to become one of Japan’s promising politicians. At the peak of his career, Arai 
was implicated in securities law violations, with allegations that he accommodated demands 
from Nikko Securities. As a result, on February 19, 1998, he committed suicide in a Tokyo 
hotel just before the House of Representatives was set to vote on his arrest. His suicide 
occurred before the truth of the allegations was disclosed. The day before he killed himself, 
he held a press conference inviting only foreign journalists. He claimed that he had become a 
scapegoat of conservative politicians and that the allegations against him stemmed from 
racial discrimination against Koreans. Arai’s case demonstrates that there are hidden forces at 
insitutional levels, especially in government, that exclude ethnic others, including naturalized 
citizens, from gaining access to the inner political circle. As a result, Arai’s efforts toward 
social integration became a losing battle. 
      
Another second-generation Korean, Kyon-dok Kim, passed the National Bar Examination but 
soon discovered that he could not join the Legal Research and Training Institute due to his 
Korean nationality. Angered by the legal requirement that one must be a citizen to practice 
law in Japan, Kim challenged the law and appealed to the Supreme Court, claiming that “the 
nationality clause” should be removed. After his sixth appeal to the Supreme Court, he 
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became Japan's first foreign legal apprentice, and in 1979, he became the first non-Japanese 
national licensed to practice as a lawyer in Japan. Kim returned to Korea in 1981 and stayed 
for two years to regain his “Koreanness.” He returned to Japan in 1985 with his Korean wife 
and opened a law office named Uri Law Office (Our Law Office). He worked on a series of 
lawsuits until he died at the young age of 56. He played a leading role in lawsuits to protect 
the rights of foreign residents, including the anti-fingerprinting movement and the wartime 
comfort women issue. He believed that the Korean language was vital to preserve Korean 
identity, and sent his three children to Korean ethnic schools (Kim 2006).  
 
Conclusion 
      
Although zainichi Koreans are required to pay taxes, they are not granted the right to 
participate in civil society and vote in the most important elections. Even though 25 percent 
of the residents of Ikuno Ward in Osaka are of Korean origin, they have no political voice. 
Influenced by the European Union as a supranational idea, the debate in Japanese society that 
foreigners should be granted local suffrage has only begun recently. There are gradual efforts 
seen in local governments to recognize residential voting rights for those holding foreign 
nationality.  
      
In contrast to Japan, the Moo-Hyun Roh administration passed “The Bill for Foreign 
Permanent Residents Obtaining Local Suffrage” in 2005. Even while Japanese politicians 
appeared indifferent to Korea’s sudden change in treatment of foreign residents, the argument 
remained that instead of granting local suffrage to foreigners, naturalization standards should 
be relaxed to encourage zainichi Koreans to apply for citizenship. In January 2008, the 
project team related to the Liberal Democratic Party Committee on the Amendment of 
Nationality Law (chairman: Tar? K?no) held a 24-day meeting with the agenda of submitting 
special legislation on a policy for easing the procedures of naturalization for Koreans holding 
special permanent residency. However, even in 2012, relaxation of naturalization standards 
has not been realized. 
      
What does it mean to be a zainichi Korean today? It is difficult to define. Fourth-generation 
Koreans, who are currently in their twenties, feel frustrated about their insecure legal status. 
On the other hand, steady but positive changes are also taking place. The number of zainichi 
Korean lawyers exceeded a hundred after Kyon-dok Kim’s death. His son became a lawyer 
and is ready to take his father’s place in stabilizing the status of zainichi Koreans and fighting 
for equal rights. Japan’s version of the civil rights movement will be further developed by the 
young Korean generation with the help of Japanese civil rights activists. This is one example 
of social integration; such collaborative efforts between Koreans and Japanese youth were 
not seen in the past. Increased rates of naturalization no longer mean yielding to 
12
 13  
discrimination. Applicants wish to participate in society more directly through Japanese 
citizenship.  
 
Currently, there is only one politician of Korean descent who publicly uses his Korea ethnic 
name, Shin-kun Hak, and it is expected that the number of politicians with non-Japanese 
backgrounds will increase. Japanese society, however, appears to be a step behind in 
recognizing these changes. Through acknowledging and incorporating zainichi Koreans and 
other minority communities, Japanese society must find a way to change so that it can come 
to terms with its past and the postcolonial legacies that continue to shape it. 
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